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This paper presents a new approach for modeling an optimal debt contract in continuous time. It examines
a competing contract design in a continuous-time environment with Markov income shocks and costly veriable
information. It shows that an optimal contract has the form of a long-term debt contract that permits a debtor's
strategic default and debt restructuring. The default is characterized by a recurrent, optimal impulse control beyond
default. Numerical examples show that the equilibrium probability of the default is decreasing in the monitoring
technology level when the default causes a big wealth loss.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since debt defaults in Latin America, Asia, and Russia repeatedly caused serious nancial turmoil in
the world economy in the 1990s, nancial markets have advanced the growth of credit derivatives (e.g.,
developments in credit default swap markets and trading of equity market volatility) to improve a technology
level of risk management dramatically. They seemed to have been successful in slicing up credit risk in some
sophisticated ways and dispersing it in their deep pocket. However, most recently, defaults on subprime loans
in a weak U.S. mortgage market triggered another serious crisis in the global nancial markets, although they
were originally just a specic domestic problem. Based on the experiences, a question is now raised: How is
the value of defaultable bonds aected by the function of information disclosure in nancial intermediation
when rms' information is private to them?
Despite such importance of the information disclosure, surprisingly, economists do not know much about
the dynamic role of information disclosure in credit risk valuation. Specically, asset pricing literature has
explored default risk in a \reduced form,"in which a default time arrives based on an exogenously given
intensity probability distribution { called an intensity-based credit-risk approach.1 Due to mathematical
tractability, this literature is often successful in capturing the eect of default in debt pricing empirically
yI would like to thank Alessandro Barbarino, Javier Birchenall, Toni Braun, Marco Cagetti, Joe Chen, Ricard Gil, Ed
Green, Lars Hansen, Milton Harris, Tokuo Iwaisako, Michihiro Kandori, Jinill Kim, Andy Levin, Takao Kobayashi, Kazuhiko
Ohashi, Makoto Saito, Jun Sekine, Akihiko Takahashi, Egon Zakraj sek, and all seminar participants at the 2006 Nippon
Finance Association annual meetings, the 2007 annual meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics in Prague, the 2007
North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society at Duke University, the Federal Reserve Board, Hitotsubashi
University, the University of Tokyo, and the Tokyo Finance Workshop, for their advice and comments. I also would like to
thank Fernando Alvarez and Kiminori Matsuyama for their comments on earlier versions. I am thankful to Roger Smith for
valuable editing assistance. All errors are my own.
1Theoretically, see, for example, Due and Singleton [16], Jarrow and Turnbull [22]. As for empirical applications, see
Duee [13], Due, Pedersen, and Singleton [15].
1from actual nancial data. However, due to a lack of a game-theoretic treatment of default, it fails to detect
strategic default incentives of debtors and the role of information disclosure on the default.2
On the other hand, there is a large nancial contracting literature on strategic default that uses contingent-
claim models of Black and Cox [5] and Merton [27] in continuous time { called a structural credit-risk
approach.3 This literature typically studies strategic default under exogenously given (mostly, complete) se-
curity structures of equity and debt. In this approach, equity owners trigger a default decision to maximize
the equity value when the rm's asset value becomes below a suciently low level (Leland and Toft [24]).
This approach is successful in explaining this specic type of endogenous default behavior theoretically.4
However, this approach is unrealistic in the sense that the lenders are assumed to decide the default through
observing directly the rm value under the complete security structures. In fact, due to the assumption of
such symmetric information, this literature understates short-term credit spreads empirically (Capponi and
Cvitani c [7]). To summarize, there is a big gap between the nancial contracting theory on the one hand
and the asset pricing literature and actual nancial data on the other.
The purpose of this paper is to bridge this gap by presenting a new approach for modeling an optimal
debt contract in continuous time. In particular, this paper looks at an optimal competitive design of a
continuous-time communication game in environments with Markov income shocks and costly veriable
information. It shows that an optimal contract takes the form of a debt contract that permits a debtor's
ex post strategic default. The equilibrium default is characterized by a discontinuous, downward jump (i.e,
\impulse") of equilibrium payment path. This equilibrium payment reduction (i.e., forgiveness) is interpreted
as debt restructuring.5 To avoid the debtor's unnecessary, intentional default, the re-contracting requires
his voluntary costly verication of bad shape in equilibrium. The debtor then tries to re-contract when the
advantage of the re-contracting exceeds the disadvantage of the costly disclosure. Otherwise, he chooses
to repudiate his debt without disclosure and lives in nancial autarky from then onwards. Thus, from a
nancial-contracting perspective, this model can examine strategic decisions between debt repudiation and
restructuring by synthesizing the costly monitoring models and the costly diversion models of Bolton and
Scharfstein [6]. Also, in this model, dierence of the information sets between the debtor and the creditor is
optimally designed and reconciles the contract theory and the asset pricing theory.6
2For example, Duee [13] shows in United States corporate data that, when debtors' credit qualities or conditions change,
there appears to be some instability of estimated default intensity parameters. This may be, at least partly, because their
strategic default actions change.
3Also, there is enormous nancial contracting literature in nite-period discrete-time models. See below.
4Furthermore, some papers study debt renegotiation in a structural form (for example, Anderson and Sundaresan [1],
Mella-Barral and Perraudin [26], Fan and Sundaresan [18].
5In practice, debt restructuring can take the form either of a cut in principal, a lengthening of maturity, or a reduction in
interest payments. This paper focuses only on the form of a reduction in interest payments.
6In this respect, structural credit-risk models with noisy, delayed, or distorted accounting information has the same spirit as
mine. They reconcile the structural credit-risk model and the intensity-based one by incorporating dierence of information sets
between lenders (or markets) and borrowers (e.g., Due and Lando [14], Capponi and Cvitani c [7], Cetin et al. [8]). However,
in those models, the dierence of the information sets is exogenous. In my model, by contrast, the dierence of measurability
of the state processes between the lenders and the borrower is optimally and endogenously formed under an optimal security
design.
2Also, this paper is mathematical tractable for numerical analyses. It shows that the equilibrium proba-
bility of the default is decreasing in a level of the disclosure technology when the default causes a big wealth
loss. Many previous models imposes default-boundary conditions exogeneously. Hence, the eect of default
costs (including disclosure costs) on the default probability depends on the exogenous boundary value. This
paper, by contrast, makes clear the eect structurally by endogenizing the default boundary values.
This paper presents a model that is an innite-horizon, continuous-time extension of a classical nite-
period (typically, two-period) costly state verication (CSV, hereafter) model, which is presented seminally
by Townsend [36]. In particular, my dynamic model uses the nite-period CSV model as one component
game. Wang [37] also studies a dynamic CSV model in innite horizon.7 A borrower's project produces single
non-storable goods by using one unit of capital that a lender invests. The income process from the project
is uncertain and its realization is privately observable to the borrower. A deterministic state verication (or
disclosure) technology is available and costly.8 Income is allocated according to the terms in a contract.
Previous CSV models have been successful in capturing the role of default as a threat of nitely costly
inspection to make promised repayments and induce truth revelation. These models have been often used
for examining empirically default costs.9 However, most of them examine short-term debts that expire at
one period. This is unrealistic. This paper, by contrast, looks at optimal strategic default behavior under
long-term debt contracts when the default value is determined endogenously based on rational expectations
on optimal future re-contracting.
This model extends Wang [37]'s model mainly in three points. First, with regard to the technological
environment, the income process is Markov in innite horizon, whereas Wang presumes individually and
independently distributed (i.i.d., hereafter) income shocks. In his model, due to a lack of intertemporal links
across stages, the equilibrium disclosure strategy is static, in that only a current shock triggers a disclosure
in a history-independent way. Nakamura [29] extends Wang's model to have two-state Markov chain shocks,
which are also restrictive. In contrast, this paper generalizes the Markov shock process to have a continuum
of states. The Markovian income shocks are more realistic than the technological assumptions in the previous
models and result in more relevant equilibrium default behavior under long-term debt contracts.
Second, this model has a common agency structure like the one presented by Epstein and Peters [17]
and Peters [31]. There are four innitely-lived risk-averse players: two borrowers and two lenders. Each of
the borrowers maximizes his ex ante lifetime utility by designing a contract non-cooperatively (or competi-
tively) to acquire the participation of one lender. This competitive structure enables us to draw competitive
implications of the optimally designed debt. In particular, in contrast to previous default literature, the bor-
7For key dierences of my model from his, see shortly below.
8Deterministic disclosure means that, if a player demands disclosure, then the disclosure is undertaken with probability one.
Note that, contrary to Wang [37]'s model, the borrower has the right to demand disclosure by incurring the costs. This twist
simplies the outcome function form in the contract, in that the less informed lender designs a contract ex ante whereas the
fully informed borrower undertakes all the ex post actions.
9For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [2], Levin, Natalucci, and Zakraj sek [25].
3rower's strategic default decision may not depend on exogenous autarky utility, but rather on competitively
determined re-contracted continuation utility. Accordingly, this paper can overcome the above-mentioned
underestimation of actual default probability.
Finally, this model has a continuous-time game structure.10 The best feature of the continuous-time
framework is mathematical tractability.11 In particular, this continuous-time contracting model has two big
advantages over discrete-time ones. First, from a theoretical standpoint, this continuous-time framework
makes complex, dynamic Bayesian games tractable to achieve complete characterizations of the equilib-
rium by solving stochastic dierential equations based on highly-established mathematical techniques.12 In
particular, it makes it possible to use a convenient Markov operator method, which provides observable
implications of potentially rich families of Markov processes.13 Second, from a practical viewpoint, by using
those well-established continuous-time stochastic process techniques, this framework is useful in numerical
applications to actual nancial data. It can incorporate many essential, practical features of asset pricing
and corporate nance such as (1) asset pricing implications, jump processes, and term structures of interest
rates, (2) hidden entrepreneurial eorts, (3) human capital accumulation of disclosure technology, and (4)
an optimal mix of debt and equity. Still, to show the dynamic role of default intuitively, this paper focuses
on a relatively simple dynamic CSV situation. Such simplication enables us to obtain closed-from solutions
regarding the positive role of default in credit-risk evaluation.
Technically, a solution method that this paper uses is new. Precisely, I solve for the optimal contract via
an impulse control method of ksendal and Sulem [30]. Contrary to continuous control problems, the state
of the system is subject to jumps (i.e., \impulses") in an impulse control problem. The timing, number, jump
size, and intensity of impulses are decision variables in the control problem. The borrower's default decision
in this dynamic CSV model is a typical impulse control. Based on this method, I show that, under several
mild regularities, there is a stationary equilibrium in which default occurs recurrently beyond re-contracting
over time. In a mathematical context, this paper has a contribution of accomplishing particular closed-
form solutions of the optimal impulse control problem under relevant economic environments, although
such accomplishment is not easy in general. In particular, as a part of the solution, I characterize the
borrower's optimization program as a stopping-time problem under information asymmetry via a stochastic
maximization principle of Bismut [4] given some boundary conditions on a nite horizon [0;] where 
denotes the rst default time.14 The boundary conditions are optimally determined as a function of the
10Nakamura [28] formalizes this dynamic CSV game as a continuous limit of discrete-time games with ne grids.
11For example, DeMarzo and Sannikov [12], Biais et al. [3], Williams [38]. For more details, see below.
12There is one caveat: in general, we must be careful when constructing a continuous-time game. A discrete-time dynamic
model can form an extensive-form game in a straightforward way by dening some relevant time interval of each stage (e.g.,
day, week, month, year, etc.) and the timing of events during a component game. In contrast, a continuous-time game has no
natural notion of a \previous"stage before a point of time (Fudenberg and Tirole [19]). Thus, it often faces some diculty with
extensive-form interpretations. Against this problem, this paper shows that ft g[[t;t + 4) is a relevant grid of an innitesimal
component game at a point of time t.
13For example, see Hansen and Scheinkman [21].
14The method of Bismut [4] is also used in Williams [38]. His paper assumes that the reported state variables are removed in
4fully revealed state variables in the process of the optimal re-contacting. Two Hamiltonian adjoint processes
(i.e., dierentials of the Hamiltonian) associated with the income and the payment stand for the borrower's
endogenous reservation utility and the shadow price of a hidden state. These adjoint processes encode
history dependence for the borrower's default decision and incentive compatibility. Due to mathematical
tractability, this paper is successful in showing reasonable sucient conditions for the existence of solutions
of the complex dynamic model and in proving the positive, dynamic role of default.
In relationships to previous literature, this paper is in line with a large literature on dynamic opti-
mal contracting using recursive methods under asymmetric information environments, which started with a
seminal paper of Green [20]. Recently, DeMarzo and Fishman [11] study a dynamic optimal capital struc-
ture in nitely horizontal discrete time when a borrower privately observes independent cash 
ows from
his investment project and is able to enjoy costly diversion from them. Tchistyi [35] extends DeMarzo and
Fishman [11]'s model into a two-state Markov chain model. Furthermore, DeMarzo and Sannikov [12] extend
Tchistyi [35]'s model into an innitely horizontal continuous-time framework. The paper of DeMarzo and
Sannikov [12] is close to my paper in the sense of studying an optimal long-term defaultable contract under
serially correlated technological environments in continuous time. Biais et al. [3] and Williams [38] also
explore continuous-time contract models in a dierent context. Those papers study standard principal-agent
communication games. In contrast, this paper explores a continuous-time CSV model in which costly dis-
closure causes strategic default jumps on an equilibrium payment path recurrently. This is a methodological
contribution of my paper.
This paper is organized as follows. The next two sections dene the physical and institutional environ-
ments. Section 4 denes the contracts and the strategies. Section 5 denes the equilibrium, solves for the
optimal contract, and characterizes it numerically. The nal section concludes.
2. ENVIRONMENT
Consider an economy with single non-storable consumption goods under uncertainty in innite-horizon
continuous time T = ftjt 2 [0;1)g.15 The stochastic basis is a ltered space (
;F;P), which satises the





, the elements of which are independent of each other.16
mechanisms, in advance, in a communication game under information asymmetry. The assumption is restrictive. By contrast,
this paper looks at a more general mechanism space that includes the reported and disclosed state variables in the CSV
environment. Rather, as in standard communication games, the optimal revelation is the center of my attention in a default
context.
15A technical appendix in the preceding working paper of this paper (namely Nakamura [28]) includes longer, technical
descriptions of this section.
16As I will describe later, W0 drives a sequence of income shocks while Ws drives a sequence of payment randomization
shocks. Also, the superscript > represents a transpose of the matrix.
52.1. Players
The economy is populated with four innitely-lived players: two identical borrowers and two identical
lenders, indexed by i = 1;10;2;20. Each player i ranks a consumption prole f
i(t) 2 R+gt2T by a time-
separable utility of consumption characterized by an instantaneous utility function fi : R+ ! R and a
common instantaneous discount rate . In particular, for simplicity, fi is of a CARA type with the absolute
risk aversion parameter  for player 2;20 and of a log type for player 2;20: Given f
i(t)gt2T, player i's













i = 2;20 where Ei
0 denotes an expectation operator conditional player i's information set at a point of time 0.
Also, player 1;10's autarky (i.e., reservation) utility level is U0 2 R; player 2;20's is V0 2 R. For notational
convenience, I will use female pronouns for the lenders (player 2;20), and male for the borrowers (player 1;10).
2.2. Technology
Each of player 2;20 has one unit of indivisible physical input (or capital), but has no investment project.
Each of player 1;10 has an investment project that, if either player 2 or 20 (not both) transfers one unit
of capital, could produce a predictable income process of the goods, denoted by fX(t)gT for each ! 2 

(otherwise, zero production), but has no capital. The two projects are the same. The capital transfer takes
place at (re-)contracting that can follow after default in which player 1 misses a promised payment. For
simplicity, the capital does not depreciate over time. The investment project then starts its production with
the capital. The income evolves as follows: with the initial value X(0) 2 R+ given,
dX(t) = 0dt + 0dW0
t
where 0;0 2 R+ are constant. Whereas (0;0) are public information, the realization of the income is
private information of player 1;10 except for the initial level X(0).
Also, a state verication (or disclosure) technology reveals the current income level to both player 2;20
with perfect accuracy. The technology is available to player 1;10. A disclosure process, denoted by d, is
predictable. Specically, player 1 can undertake disclosure at t  for any t > 0. If d(t ) = 1, disclosure is
undertaken (otherwise, no disclosure). A point of time t is said to be a disclosure time if d(t ) = 1. When
player 1 undertakes disclosure, this technology requires a constant amount of the resources CX 2 R+ { call
it disclosure costs { from his current income at the disclosure time and causes the time path of his income
to decrease permanently relative to what it would otherwise be:
X() = X( )   CX:
6The resource loss is deadweight loss. Higher costs mean a lower level of the disclosure technology (and vice
versa). The value CX is public information. By using this costly disclosure technology, player 1;10 can
control his own income process downward in such a discontinuous way (i.e., \impulsively").
3. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
This section describes an institutional structure of the (re-)contracting and the income allocation between
the players in continuous time. Each player i's information set is denoted by Fi;t  for t  (t  0) { call it
player i's private ltration { which is generated by the processes distinguishable to player i prior to t (i.e.,
at or prior to the left-limit time t ). Since player 1;10 try to take informational advantage in this CSV





t [] denote player i's conditional
expectation operator given Fi;t . There is an arbitrarily small time duration dt for t such that during a time
interval ft g [ [t;t + dt), an instant-t component game is played { call this interval grid t as well.17
A contract prescribes (1) a recommended participation probability p 2 [0;1] and (2)a payment rule to a
lender, in which fS(t);t 2 Tg denotes the payment trajectory as a continuous function of player 1's messages,
the observed actions and outcomes, and the calendar time conditional on the participation. In particular, the
institutional structure consists of two parts: (1) (re-)contracting and (2) dynamic games under a contracted
mechanism.
3.1. Contracting
This economy starts with a contracting stage. At the initial point of time 0, each of player 1;10 announces
a contract. During the announcement, neither player 1 nor 10 can observe the contract announced by the
other, while player 2;20 can observe the two announced contracts. Next, each of player 2;20 independently
communicates with player 1;10 by reporting player 1 (or 10)'s contract, denoted by M(0) 2 M
 (M
 denotes
a well-dened direct message space regarding contracts), privately to player 10 (or 1). Player 2;20 does not
necessarily tell the truth. In turn, each of player 1;10 reports a recommended participation probability into
his own contract. Let P = f0;1g denote the set of player 1's participation decision (1 denotes participation; 0
no participation). Let 4(P) = [0;1] (its element p
 given a contract 
) denote the space of the recommended
participation probability that player 2 announcing 
 gives to player 1 at time 0 after receiving player 2's
message M(0) 2 M
. Player 2 then chooses one contract from the two announced ones and enters into
a bilateral contract with a chosen lender. The capital transfer then follows. If a contracting fails, then
17As Simon and Stinchcombe [34] discuss, there is no natural notion of the previous stage before a point of time t in a
continuous-time game. In fact, generally, there may not exist a sequence of the discrete-time games that would converge to the
continuous-time game (with some relevant topology) as the discrete-time grid goes to zero. This model is not an exception.
That is because, by construction, player 1's report and strategic actions at a stage may cause some information 
ows across
the following stages in an innitesimal component game. Nakamura [28] shows this continuous-time game as a continuous limit
by dening an appropriate topology. That is, for each t, I can dene the very ne time grid ft g [ [t;t + dt) during which a
component game is played.
7the players must live in autarky. The process until the agreement is called a contracting stage (Figure 1).
The contracts are exclusive so long as the contract is committed to after the agreement. Still, there exists
 
Borrowers announce mechanisms. 
Lenders report the mechanisms. 
Borrowers report recommended participation. 
Lenders observe both of them. 
One borrower cannot observe the other 
borrower’s mechanism. 
Lenders send messages of the announced 
mechanisms to each borrower. 
Each lender chooses a mechanism. 
Making a contract. 
FIG. 1 Timing of events in a contracting stage
contractual externality through the participation probability ex ante. As I will describe below, this paper
focuses attention on competition at this contracting stage and draws competitive implications of an optimal
contract.
3.2. Dynamic game under a contracted mechanism
Next, a dynamic game starts between two contracting players (say, player 1;2) according to terms in the
contract. Player 1's production starts with the invested capital, and the output is allocated between them.
For t > 0, a component game evolves for a very short ne duration ft g[[t;t + dt) (or grid t) (for the details
of the \very ne time", see Nakamura [28]). The component game consists of three stages: commitment,
production, and payment stages (Figure 2).18 First, at the commitment stage t  for t > 0, player 1 decides
whether or not to terminate the contract. If player 1 does not terminate the contract, then the stage game
moves on to the next stage. Or, if player 1 does, then player 2 repossesses the capital from player 1. The
contract then ends; both the players are separated. This event is a specic meaning of default in this paper.
At this point, player 1 has an additional option to disclose his true state or not. If player 1 does not disclose,
he must live in autarky, without producing anything forever, as in Bolton and Scharfstein [6]. On the other
hand, if disclosure is undertaken, then defaulting player 1 is given a chance to enter into a new contract with a
lender only if disclosure occurs. That is, the component game then immediately moves back to a contracting
18I interpret that, at the initial point t = 0, the game starts with the production stage. This interpretation is relevant,








Controlled by borrower. 
(Default, Disclosure) →  Go to re-contracting, 
or (No default, No disclosure) →  Go to next stage. 
Controlled by Nature. 
Driven by a 1-dimensional geometric Brownian motion. 
Message sent by borrower. 
Payment prescribed in the mechanism. 
Both consume allocated goods. 
The dynamic game moves on continuously. 
FIG. 2 Timing of events in a component game
stage at  { call it re-contracting. Precisely, after both player 2;20 observe player 1's current state X(t ),
the income path is lowered discontinuously by the amount of the disclosure costs: X() = X( ) CX at a
disclosure time . In addition, he loses reputation, denoted by R(X ( );S ( );S ()) 2 R, at the default
time:
R(X ( );S ( );S ()) , CR [K + fS ( )   S ()g   fX ( )   S ( )g]:
where CR;K 2 R+ are constant. In other words, higher payment allowance beyond default (i.e., S ( )  
S ()) relative to his consumption level (i.e., X ( ) S ( )) results in higher reputation loss, multiplied by
CR, in addition to the constant reputation loss (i.e., CRK). The game then goes back to a (re-)contracting
stage.
The borrowers have an incentive to continue to keep a contractual relationship beyond default, so long as
the contract is expected to promise them no smaller than the reservation utility. At the same time, they have
no incentive to undertake disclosure while committing to the contract to save the disclosure costs. Also, not
only the borrowers but also the lenders have an incentive to minimize the disclosure costs over time in order
to maintain as much income as possible. Accordingly, player 1;10 draw up a contract that seeks to balance
two goals conditional on player 2;20's participation: (1) to make player 1;10 reveal his true state as frequently
as possible in order to prevent player 1;10 from excessive exploitation of the informational rents and (2) to
make player 1;10 reveal his true state as infrequently as possible in order to reduce the disclosure costs.
Thus, in equilibrium, disclosure does not occur when he does not default. Therefore, player 1's actions at
9this stage are characterized by two compound actions: fdefault, disclosureg and fno default, no disclosureg,
unless the contract breaks the reservation utility.
Next, when default does not occur at the commitment stage, this component game moves on to a
production stage. At this stage, the grid-t output is produced, as dened above, and reveals the true output
amount (i.e., grid-t true state) only to player 1: dX(t) = 0dt + 0dW0
t .
Third, the component game proceeds to a payment stage. At this stage, player 1 sends a message of his
current state, M(t) 2 MX (MX denotes player 1's dated message space regarding his own current income
levels), to player 2. The message is not necessarily true. Player 1 then makes a payment to player 2 as
prescribed by the contract. At the end of the grid, they consume the allocated goods. The dynamic game
moves on continuously.
4. CONTRACT FORMS AND STRATEGIES
With the above specications, characterize the contract (say, between player 1;2) at date  (  019) as:





 4(P). That is, given the initial income level X() 2: R+,  denotes the set
of payment processes S from player 1 to player 2, P = f0;1g (1 denotes participation; 0 no participation),
and 4(P) = [0;1] (its element p
 given a contract 
) denotes the space of the recommended participation
probability that player 1 announcing 
 gives to player 2 at  after receiving player 2's message M() 2 M
.
MX denotes the set of the payment process as a map from MX to , and

MX	P
denotes the set of the
payment processes conditional on player 1's participation. I also call the outcome function 
 as a contract.
To make clear the contracting time  , a subscript  may be added to 





s 2 MX denotes a payment rule after the participation given the latest disclosed income level X()
and 
p denotes a recommended participation probability. Accordingly, Date-t consumption levels of player 1
and player 2 can be written as 
1(t) = X(t)   
s(t) = X(t)   S(t) and 
2(t) = 
s(t) = S(t).
A contract is said to be feasible if the payment is not larger than the whole income in any state at
each time, i.e., 0  
s(M(t);X())  X(t) for any M(t) 2 MX, and t   given X() almost everywhere
(a.e., hereafter), almost surely (a.s., hereafter) conditional on the participation. As I will show later, in an
equilibrium, the borrower's strategic default necessarily ensures his strictly possible consumption. Therefore,
the assumption is not restrictive. Let  0 denote the set of the feasible contracts, endowed with some topology.
Moreover, this paper focuses on a particular form of contracts as follows. The payment S(t) is predictable
and is stationary Markovian in the sense that it is dependent only on the current actions and outcomes that
player 2 can distinguish. In particular, I focus on continuous payment proles except for discontinuities on
the sample paths caused by default. Precisely,
19For notational convenience, the initial point 0 is interpreted as a default time in order to achieve the recursion of the
model. As small abuse of mathematical language, 0  is set to be its imaginary disclosure time.
10Assumption 4.1. For some predictable processes ; and for m  t < m+1 (m = 1;2;:::),
dS(t) = dt + dW s
t
where m denotes the mth state verication time.
Accordingly,  represents the drift of the payment; dWs
t is a randomization to conceal a pure choice of
the payment level at each t.  is the amplitude of the randomization. In particular,  = 0 would mean no
randomization in the contract.
This existence assumption of these predictable processes ; is not quite restrictive for the continuous
payment time path during a non-default phase. In other words, basically, the continuity of the payment
process is the main restriction here.
Furthermore, let  := R+ [ f0g. Let A denote an equicontinuous family of real-valued functions on MX
that is uniformly bounded on any closed interval on MX. By the Ascoli-Arzel a Theorem, A is relatively
compact in a set of all the continuous mappings (Royden [32], theorems 40,41, p. 169).
Assumption 4.2.  2  and (M(t)) 2 A.
In other words,  depends on player 1's messages in a stationary Markovian structure, whereas  is constant,
independent of player 1's messages. As to the constant , Assumption 4.2 looks restrictive. However, since the
payment path is observable to both the players, based on the quadratic valuation of the process, the player 2
can infer the observed payment path at each instant. Therefore, Assumption 4.2 is not quite restrictive
(also, see Cvitani c, Wan, and Zhang [10]). Accordingly, the continuous payment prole is characterized by
S(m) 2 R+ and its subsequent evolution by a geometric Brownian motion unless state verication occurs:
for m  t < m+1 (m = 1;2;:::),
dS(t) = (M(t))dt + dW s
t :
Also, the re-contracted payment is characterized by a deterministic function:
S() = ^ S(S( );X( )) for a disclosure time 
where S( ) denotes the payment level prescribed at the \previous"stage and X( ) denotes the disclosed
income level.
In summary, at time 0, 
s is characterized by (S(0);;) in R+A, rather than designs S complexly.
Write 
s = (S(0);;) as well. A contract is said to be continuous if it satises those particular specications.
Let   denote the set of continuous contracts in  0. Assume that the set of continuous contracts   is non-
11empty. Dene  s as the set of 
s corresponding to each 
 2  . Assume that there is no randomization across
the elements of  .
5. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN
5.1. Equilibrium
This section solves for an optimal contract. I simplify the model by using several results that are obtained
in standard CSV models (e.g., Townsend [36]) and in standard competitive mechanism design problems (e.g.,
Epstein and Peters [17], Peters [31]) and conne attention to a specic form of equilibria in the following
three points.20
The rst simplication is about a revelation principle in the common agency setting. The principals'
contracts can depend on one another in complex ways: player 2's contract may depend whether player 20's
contract depends on player 2 contract depends...and so on. Thus the set of the agent's true states that matter
in the contract designs must come from an innite dimensional space even when the set of states are nite
in a conventional sense. In particular, the announced contracts reveal some information beyond the reports
of his own type. In other words, the surjection of the strategy mapping of the reporting is lost. Therefore, a
standard direct-revelation principle does not hold for the communication games  . Thus, instead of resorting
to a standard revelation principle, this paper connes attention only to the set of \menus" of payo-relevant
actions, like Peters [31] does.21 That is, for any set of indirect mechanisms feasible for the lenders, and
for any equilibrium relative to the set, there is an equilibrium in menus that preserves the corresponding
equilibrium allocation, although some equilibria relative to such optimally designed menu may not be in the
equilibrium allocations in an indirect mechanism. This paper achieves such a modied revelation principle
by assuming that there always exists an equilibrium relative to the set of feasible indirect mechanisms such
that equilibrium allocations relative to the set of the menus are preserved. In this sense, this paper focuses
on a smaller set of indirect mechanisms than in standard revelation principles.
Second, with regard to the optimal payment rule, from the results of standard CSV models (e.g.,
Townsend [36]),  should be written in a form that is independent of the borrower's messages. In CSV
environments, player 1's messages are not able to deliver credible information because of the disclosure
costs. That is, in CSV environments, any payment rule that could depend on ex post control is not in
equilibrium, because such a rule would cause the borrower to report the lowest value that could avoid de-
fault when the outcome is in non-default region; hence, it is not incentive compatible. At the same time,
player 2 has an incentive to minimize the disclosure costs from a dynamic perspective because he does not
20Note that Nakamura [28] studies a generalized version of this model and shows that such simplication does not lose
generality.
21Epstein and Peters [17] proves the existence of a revelation principle by using a recursive method. However, as Peters [31]
says, their method is not quite tractable practically.
12like excessive shrinkage of the whole \pie"to be shared between the players. Thus player 2 permits player 1
to take some informational advantage without revealing the true state, but rather tries to secure a certain
critical level of payment. Player 1's welfare must be indierent with respect to whether or not to disclose at
the critical payment level. Accordingly, the threshold is ex-post observable to player 2. Also, if  depends
on player 1's report, then he would always report the lowest income level among the permissible set. That
is not incentive compatible. According to such standard CSV discussions,  is constant between immediate
disclosures. Player 2 prescribes the set of a payment process based on the payo-relevant variables. The
menu is independent of the reports. Player 1 is said to keep (break) his payment promise if he makes a pay-
ment that is consistent with the prescribed menu (otherwise). Player 1 keeps the payment promise unless
the continuation utility goes below liquidation value that he receives when he defaults. In this model, the
defaulting borrower decides whether or not to disclose and keep access to the contractual relationship. Hence,
the liquidation value can take on two values: the nancially autarkic value U0 and the expected re-contracted
continuation utility that is endogenously determined under a competitive contract design between player 2;20
after the costly disclosure. According to standard CSV discussions, we can guess that, in equilibrium, the
borrower chooses disclosure only in his bad shape to achieve a lower payment liability beyond the default.
The verication plays a role of a credible excuse for the payment allowance. Furthermore, I can focus on a
deterministic payment rule in equilibrium. Since the payment path is observable to both the players, any
randomization in payment rule (i.e.,  > 0) would increase uncertainty under their contractual relationship,
without increasing expected income returns. In equilibrium, it is unfavorable not only to the borrower but
also to the lender. Therefore,  = 0. In summary, fS();g 2 R2 characterizes the re-contracted payment
rule.
Third, this section restricts attention only to a rational expectations equilibrium. In this framework, the
re-contracted payment rule fS();g (and so the re-contracted continuation utility) is determined as a result
of the competition among the players. At a re-contracting stage, each of the borrowers oers a contract that
promises himself his willing-to-pay level so as not to lose in competition with the other borrower. On the
other hand, each of the lenders accepts the oer to avoid loss in competition with the other lender. Based
on the symmetry assumption of the strategies, this paper focuses on a rational expectations equilibrium
in which each borrower enters into a symmetric contract with a lender, so long as it promises larger than
the reservation utility.22 The biggest advantage of this competitive treatment is that the contract is not
necessarily threatened by the exogenous autarky threat, but by the borrower's willing-to-pay continuation
utility. In standard principal-agent models, exogenous autarky utility level often plays a role of a threat.
Since the threat is often unrealistically strong, most of those models underestimate actual default probability.
In contrast, in my competitive contract design model, the re-contracted continuation utility is determined
22Strictly speaking, the negotiation may not reach at the equilibrium. See the detailed discussions in Epstein and Peters [17].
13in an endogenous, competitive way. Reservation utility U0;V0 may not bind in the equilibrium. This setting
seems more realistic in practice.
Now, this section studies player 1's optimal contract design that permits his strategic default, which
is formulated as an impulse control in an incentive-comparative way when he can observe the true states
privately, subject to reservation utility U0;V0, with X(0);S(0) given.
Specically, an impulse control for this system is a triple (possibly nite) sequence:
 , f1;2;:::;j:::;1;2;:::;j;:::;1;2;:::;j;:::g
where j denotes jth default time; j = (j) , S (j ) S (j) =  dS(j) denotes a downward jump of the
payment path (i.e., the payment allowance beyond default) at j; additionally, in this model, player 1 controls





t 2 T dene the uncontrolled state process. With an impulse control  given, the corresponding state




is dened inductively by:































































































5 for j  t < j+1 (j = 2;3;:::);
Therefore, the controlled process is lowered discontinuously and permanently at each default time than it
would be otherwise. Note that, for physical consistency, this model imposes the following physical constraint:
S()(t)  0;X()(t)  0;X()(t)   S()(t)  0 a.s. for all t: (5.2)
14Dene the explosion time of Y ()(t) as:









   R
o
Assume, then, that we are given a set V of admissible impulse controls that is included in the set of  such
that a unique solution Y () of the state evolution equations 5.1 exists and
 = 1 a.s.
Also, before such an explosion, in this model, the contract may end when it cannot promise the reservation
utility to either player. Let S  R, called a solvency region, dene the set of the values of the state
variables that promise no smaller than the reservation utilities to both the contracting players. Implicitly,
this model presumes that the continuation utility (i.e., the remaining utility from now onwards) of the players
is represented by a certain function of the current state variables levels in the Markovian environment.
Assume that there exists such an open set S that Y (0) 2 S. Dene another Ft-stopping time S
S , inf
n
t 2 (0;);Y ()(t) = 2 S
o
That is, if either player is given smaller continuation utility than his reservation utility at the rst time S,
then the contract is terminated and both players live in autarky from now onwards with U0;V0 given.
Now, dene player 1's expected utility with an impulse control  and Y (0) given:








0 e t [ expf (X(t)   S(t))g]dt
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subject to the state evolution equations (5.1) where fS<1g is an index indicator that takes 1 if S < 1
(otherwise 0). The expected value of each term on the right hand side of Equation (5.3), operated by E1
0, is
assumed to be nite for Y (0) 2 S; 2 V. The impulse control problem is written as: Find player 1's value
function, optimized expected discounted utility at 0 given Y (0) 2 S, denoted by U(Y (0)) = U(X(0);S(0)),
and  2 V such that







In the remaining, I suppress superscript () on those controlled state variables, unless it causes any confusion.
155.2. Characterization of the optimal contract
Following ksendal and Sulem [30] (in particular, Theorem 6.2, p.83)), this subsection shows below
that player 1's optimization problem (5.4) is rewritten in the form of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations as
follows: Find player 1's value function U(Y (0)) = U(X(0);S(0)) = u(Y (0)) = u(X(0);S(0)) and an optimal
impulse control  2 V characterized inductively by f;k();g, in which k() = S( )   S() (time-
payment allowance) and u :  S ! R 2 C1(S) \ C(  S)23, such that


























s.t. for 0  t < ;
dX (t) = 0dt + 0dW0
t ;
dS (t) = dt;
for t = 
X () = X ( )   CX;
u(X (0);S (0))  U0




e t ln[S (t)]dt + e SV0fS<1g

 V0
where, for H : the space of all measurable functions h : S ! R, T : H ! H denotes a one-step default
operator. As in standard impulse control problems, put some technical assumptions:
(1) there is a region in S, called the continuation region D, such that:
D , fY 2 S;u(Y ) > T u(Y )g:
Intuitively, player 1 does not undertake default and keeps the promised payment so long as the state path is
in this region.
(2) u 2 C2(Sn@D) with locally bounded derivatives near @D where @D denote the boundary of the set D.
These assumptions are satised in numerical examples discussed below.
23For any set U, C(U) means the continuous functions from U to S. Ck(U) denotes the functions in C(U) with continuous
derivatives up to order k.  U denotes the closure of the set U.
16Now, look at the characteristics of the equilibria in more details. Fix a triple f ;X ( );S ( )g as
given. Focus on the borrower's optimization at the left-limit time  :
max
()
u(X ();S ())   CR [K + ()   fX ( )   S ( )g]
The rst-order condition with respect to () (or S()) is:
us (X ();S ()) + CR = 0: (5.5)
where us , @u
@S. Assume that, for f ;X ( );S ( )g, there exists such a maximand S(), which is denoted
by S(). Also, let () , S ( )   S () denote the optimal downward jump of the payment path (i.e.,
 dS( )) given X ( ) and S ( ), that is, date- payment allowance that is given to the borrower optimized
conditional on X ( ) and S ( ). Assume also that the second-order condition is satised:
uss (X ();S ()) < 0
where uss , @
2u
@S2.
Dene Z (t) = X (t)   S (t). Correspondingly, with small abuse of language, change the notations of the
value functions U (Z (t)) = U (X (t);S (t)), u(Z (t)) = u(X (t);S (t)), and V (Z (t)) = V (X (t);S (t)) for
all t. Now, we can guess that the borrower's program is rewritten as follows: with Z(0) = X(0) S(0) given,
nd value function U(Z(0)) = u(Z(0)) and an optimal impulse control  2 V characterized inductively by
fg








0 e t f exp[ Z (t)]gdt




s.t. for 0  t < ,
dZ (t) = (0   )dt + 0dW0
t
for t = ,
Z () = Z ( ) + ()   CX
u(Z(0))  U0;V (Z(0))  V0:
The problem is reduced into a stopping-time problem. Correspondingly, assume that u(Z (t)) is continuous
and twice dierentiable with respect to Z (t). In particular, assume that for an arbitrarily large nite time
17T, there exists the rst stopping time  in [0;T]. If this is not true, player 1 could exploit informational rents
over time. That would not be in equilibrium. Hence, without loss of generality, I can focus the discussions
on how player 1 undertakes the rst default  under a given contract and how player 2 designs the contract
to induce player 1's default in his desirable way from his long-run (i.e., stationary) perspective. The above
rst-order and second-order condition are rewritten as:
uz (Z ()) = CR and uzz (Z ()) < 0: (5.7)
where uz , du
dZ and uzz , d
2u
dZ2.
Next, this section characterizes the implementability of contract. Specically, given such S(0);;(),

























0 (0   )du. By the above hypotheses, Novikov's condition is satised. Therefore,
(t) is a martingale with E [( )] = (0) = 1. By the Girsanov theorem, I have a new measure  P0:
dP0
d  P0 = ( ):
Call the distribution process  the relative density process. Replace the original state variable Z with a new
state variable pair . The evolution equations of the new state variables are rewritten as: for 0  t < ,
given (0) = 1,
d(t) = (t)
 1
0 (0   )d  W0
t

















0 (0   )d  W0
t for 0  t < ;
Z () = Z ( ) + ()   CX for t = ;
u(Z(0))  U0;v(Z(0))  V0
18where  E1
0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set F1;0 under the changed
measure.
Following Bismut [4], I use a stochastic maximization principle in continuous time for 0  t   . Let
	;, respectively, denote the adjoint processes associated with  and the target volatility of the adjoint
process. Given , for 0  t < , the Hamiltonian for this problem with the adjoint equations is:
H() = 
 1












dt + (t)d  W0
t (5.10)




By a stochastic maximum principle,
Lemma 5.1. There exist F1;t-predictable adjoint processes f	(t);(t)g, which satisfy the evolution equa-
tion (5.10). In addition, given () induced by Equations (5.7),  satises for almost every t 2 [0; ] a.s.,
H() = maxfg H() in the Hamiltonian (5.9).
Let the superscript  of a variable denote its optimal value. From the boundary conditions with respect
to the backward variables,
	( ) = u( ): (5.11)
For 0  t   , 	(t) represents player 1's reservation continuation utility level, which player 1 would accept
without requesting a default at t. Hence, they constitute additional state variables in this optimization
program. More specically, the condition implies incentive compatibility, which only binds at  , in terms
of contract theory; at the same time, it implies a value matching condition in terms of control theory.
Now, I characterize a class of the implementable contracts. Dene player 1's target controls as f^ ;(^ )g
under a given contract S(0);. Let the association between a contract 
s and player 1's target controls
f^ ;(^ )g be denoted by a contract correspondence  f^ ;(^ )g, which is induced as a result of the optimal
contract designs for each target f^ ;(^ )g. A contract is said to be implementable if f^ ;(^ )g is an optimal
control when player 1 faces the contract correspondence  f^ ;(^ )g. By Lemma 5.1 above and the stochastic
maximum principle of Bismut [4],
19Proposition 5.1. A contract is implementable if and only if (1) the contract satises u(Z(0))  U0
and V (Z(0))  V0, (2) the contract and its optimal control f^ ;(^ )g satises the solutions of the Hamilto-
nian (5.9) for , and (3) for almost every t 2 [0; ], a.s. H() = maxfg H().
The basic logic of the proof is the same as the one in Williams [38], because, from standard CSV
discussions, the optimal mechanisms are independent of the borrower's reports except for default time in
this CSV model. Let   denote the set of implementable contract 





Due to the log utility of player 2, if  < 0, the payment becomes negative with some probability. That
is not in  . Since player 1 competitively write the contract in a favorable way to himself,
Lemma 5.2. An optimal contract in   has  = 0.
This means that, if an optimal contract exists, it would pay a xed coupon at every instant.
Finally, following ksendal and Sulem [30] (in particular, Theorem 6.2, p.83)), I impose several technical
assumptions (see the details in Nakamura [28]). Then, this paper obtains my main result:
Theorem 5.1. There exist player 1's value function U(Z(0)) = u(Z(0)) and an optimal impulse con-
trol  2 V characterized inductively by f;k(); = 0g via Equations (5.7),(5.11) and Lemma 5.2.
This optimal contract takes the form of a debt contract in the sense that, (1) the contract promises
the lender a xed repayment, (2) the borrower has the control, (3) the borrower has the right to default
strategically, and (4) debt reorganization is possible. More concrete characteristics are discussed in the next
subsection.
5.3. Quantitative Example
The previous subsection characterized the optimal contract and the equilibrium default behavior under
it. However, since I posed several high-level assumptions there, it is uncertain whether such equilibria exist
in relevant environments. This subsection species the contract and the default behavior in a quantitative
example.
First, for characterizing the allocations between the players completely, I conne attention to the following
specic forms of the allocations:
Assumption 5.1. uz (Z (0)) = CR.
I.e., Y (0) 2 @D. Especially, dene DZ , fZ 2 Z;Y 2 Dg where Z denotes the set of Z 2 R that is
consistent with Y 2 R2. This means that Equation (5.7) holds at initial point of time 0. Intuitively, since
this paper focuses on stationary (i.e., long-run) characteristics of the equilibria, this model can presume that
the contract is determined in equilibrium even at the initial point. In other words, we can imagine that this
20model picks up one default point as an initial point when the contractual relationship converges already to
a stationary equilibrium. Also,
Assumption 5.2. The shadow price of the payment is continuous at each default time for player 1 when
the reservation utility is not binding.
This condition is called the smooth-pasting condition in terms of control theory. More precisely, for a
boundary b 2 @D,
lim
z2D!b
uz (Z) = uz (b) = uz (Z) + CR = 2CR (5.12)
where Z , b+() CX represents the borrower's renewed share after the costly default. The last equality
uses the result of Equation (5.7).
Also, the value-matching condition, characterized by Equation (5.11), holds for implementability of the
contract: at the same b 2 @D,
lim
z2D!b
u(Z) = u(b) = u(Z)   CR (K + ()   b) (5.13)
Furthermore, I conne attention of the impulse control problem with a one-sided barrier that triggers
player 1's strategic default and debt restructuring. In standard impulse control models, mathematically, two
barriers are possible for DZ: DZ = (b;B)  R (b < B;b;B 2 R) { call b lower barrier (or, 
oor) and B upper
barrier (or, ceiling). In my framework, by contrast, due to suciently large disclosure costs, when player 1
has informational advantage over player 2 in his good shape, re-contracting would not improve player 1's
welfare. In addition, liquidation would lead to nancial autarky U0. Hence, in this model, the barrier that
triggers strategic default in equilibrium: DZ = (b;+1). In other words, the lower barrier provides player 1
a \put" opportunity: there is no upper barrier, whereas the 
oor b means that, if player 1's production
becomes so low that his after-repayment income Z is below b, he undertakes default. More precisely, there
exists an interval (b;+1) and a point Z 2 (b;+1) such that, if z is in (0;b], then the path immediately
jumps to z, whereas if for some t, z is inside (b;+1) and subsequently the path hits b from above, then it
also jumps to z.
Inside the continuation region D (i.e., Z 2 (b;+1)), the evolution of player 1's value function u(Z)
follows the Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman (or HJB) equation (Figure 3):
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FIG. 3 Impulse control
characterized by Theorem 5.1 (in particular, Equations (5.7),(5.12) and (5.13)) in the following example:
X(0) = 4; 0 =  0:05; 0 = 1; CX = 0:2; CR = 0:1; K = 0:5;
 = 1;  = 0:03:
In consequence, this example reaches at a stationary equilibrium:
u(Z) =  0:1904  exp( Z)   0:9521  exp(1Z)   0:3014  exp(2Z)
where f1;2g = f 0:2;0:3g are the roots of the equation 0
2 2 + 0    = 0, and
u(Z(0)) =  1:2534; Z = Z(0) = 1:0285; b = 0:4076; () = 0:8209:
Also, uzz(Z) =  0:136 < 0 satises the second order condition at Z. Hence, by Assumption 5.1, Z(j)
and bj are constant for each default number j. Correspondingly, the amount of the payment allowance is
constant at each default time. Therefore, the optimal contract takes the form of a debt contract that pays
a xed coupon 2:9715dt (= fX(0) Z(0)gdt = (4   1:0285)dt) for a ne time interval dt. The payment
allowance beyond default is 0:8209 (Figure 4).24 In particular, regardless of player 2's nonlinear utility, the
optimality of the debt structure is preserved.
This model presumes that Y (0) 2 S in this model. Specically, this model sets U0;V0 such that U0 is
smaller than u(Z(0)) =  1:2534 and V0 is smaller than the continuation utility promised by the stream
of the xed coupon 2:9715  dt with the expected default probability given. Hence, players enter into the
24This simulation is based on a simple discretization method. Hence, when the after-payment income path hits the lower



























contract necessarily at the initial point 0. However, when 0 is not so high, recurrent disclosure results in
shrinkage of the economy due to the disclosure costs. Because the payment allowance is constant, the share
of each player decreases at every disclosure time. In the end, either of U(Y (t));V (Y (t)) hits the reservation
utility; this exit time is S. The contract is then liquidated forever. On the other hand, when 0 is very
high, default may not occur at all. That means that player 1 exploits excessive informational advantage
throughout time.
With respect to the equilibrium default behavior, a default time is expected to arrive based on an
endogenously formed probability distribution, while from player 1's viewpoint, a default occurs strategically.
When the contract keeps to promise the reservation utility, the expected default probability at the initial
point is:
(0) , ProbfZ(0)=Zg [Z() = b] = expf1(Z   b)g = 0:8832:
In addition, with regard to ex post default probability expected by the less informed lender, in the continua-
tion region D after default, player 2 observes the payment sample-path but does not observe the true income
sample-path. Therefore, she expects the default based on the expected income. That is, at a point of time t












(t   )   b

This is the Laplace transform of the default intensity, which is often used in previous credit-risk literature.
These results give strategic insights into an exogenous default intesity that has been often used in the
reduced-form credit-risk model (Due and Singleton [16]). In particular, such synthesis between the contract
23theory and the asset pricing theory is due to endogenously formed dierence of the information sets (i.e.,
measurability) between the lender and the borrower.
Finally, look at comparative statics with respect to the disclosure technology. In general, the eect of
the disclosure technology on the contract terms and the default probability is uncertain, because a higher
level of the disclosure technology (i.e., lower CX) causes two opposite eects: substitution eect and wealth
eect. Specically, on the one hand, lower CX means less default costs and results in more frequent default
(and debt restructuring) (substitution eect). On the other hand, a discontinuous downward jump of income
path causes bigger wealth loss and makes the economy more risk averse to the default shock (wealth eect).
Therefore, the total eect of the two is uncertain, and so depends on parametric assumptions. A comparative
static with respect to the disclosure cost CX 2 (0;3:5] in the above example shows that, when the optimal
contract promises the reservation utility, (0) (the distance from player 1's renewed consumption level Z
to the 
oor b, resp.) is increasing (decreasing) in the disclosure cost parameter CX, while the payment





















FIG. 5 Comparative static with respect to disclosure cost
the substitution eect. A discontinuous downward jump of income path in default tends to cause some big
wealth eect.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studied dynamic CSV in continuous time in competitive environments and established a
continuous-time, competitive model of the Markov communication game in costly veriable information
environments. This paper shows, rst, that an optimal contract takes the form of a debt, in the sense that
the payment prole is deterministic almost everywhere except for a countable, discrete set of the downward
discontinuities at the default times and that the contract permits the borrower to default at any instant.
24The optimal contract is ex ante describable, although the costly default itself is incontractible. Second, with
respect to the equilibrium default behavior, state verication occurs when, and only when, a default occurs.
Less informed lender expects equilibrium default time to arrive based on a endogenously formed default
probability, while the fully informed borrower defaults strategically.
Based on mathematical tractability, this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the contract
terms and the default probability under the optimally designed debt contract in relationships with structural
parameters of technology (income growth and uncertainty, disclosure technology levels, and reputation costs)
and of utility (risk aversion, intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and time preference). Accordingly,
this model has many possibilities of future extensions and provides a better framework than before to
analyze actual nancial data, although they are out of the scope of this paper. For example, rst, due to
a general equilibrium framework with non-linear utility, this model is applicable to asset pricing models by
incorporating security trading. It may tract the eect of ratings on credit-risk evaluation. Also, since lenders
have standard CRRA-type power utility, this model can be extended directly into a long-run risk model with
recursive utility in which intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity and deal with term structures of
interest rates.
Second, the income process can be modied. Since this model presumes a continuous income process. a
continuous decrease in income triggers default predictably. In particular, nancial autarky may occur only
after recurrent debt restructuring. On the other hand, if income process involves jump terms, then a big
negative jump in income may result in abrupt default. Financial autarky may then occur abruptly without
trying to restructure debt.
Third, due to mathematical tractability, this framework can tract hidden entrepreneurial eorts of the
borrower, together with the above-specied asymmetric information. In practice, a borrower's ex post lazy
performance often seems to cause unnecessary default when lenders cannot verify his eorts. This is a serious
moral hazard problem under a actual debt contract. Since this model can deal with hidden action and hidden
information simultaneously, it can examine interactions between the two eects in corporate nance.
Fourth, human capital accumulation of the disclosure technology can be studied. In practice, rating
agencies, auditors, and nancial intermediation undertake a disclosure technology. The technology tends to
deteriorate when nancial innovations are advancing dramatically. Especially, in economic recessions, the
disclosure technology is intensively demanded to measure economic uncertainty and evaluate bad-shaped
rms. In fact, the productivity of the disclosure technology is time-varying. Several empirical results show
that the disclosure costs are negatively correlated with business cycles in the US: disclosure procedures
tend to be more costly in a recession period than in a booming one. Such pro-cyclicality of disclosure
productivity implies that, in an economic recession, deteriorated disclosure ability might delay an economic
recovery. Although this paper assumes a xed level of disclosure technology, this framework can incorporate
25endogenous human capital accumulation of the disclosure technology. The application enables us to examine
monitoring ability of nancial intermediation and the regulation problems of rating agencies and auditors
more eectively.
Fifth, this framework can deal with the optimality of a mix of debt and equity due to mathematical
tractability. Due to such simplied structure, the above model is unable to explain optimal ownership of
equity claims by outside lenders, as in standard CSV models. This result is unrealistic. In fact, this mitigates
the direct applicability of this model to actual nancial data. By contrast, by assuming that a part of income
is observable, this model can be modied to explore an optimal mix of debt and equity in corporate nance.
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